

Evaluating HTI's Commitment of Peaceful Way in Promulgating Its Messages in the Democratic Indonesian State

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Abstrak: Artikel ini menjelaskan kemunculan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) sejak tahun 1980an, di masa-masa demokrasi. HTI dengan menggunakan sarana demokrasi justru berupaya mendirikan kekhalifahan dengan implementasi hukum Islam dalam kehidupan sehari-hari, tapi tidak dengan cara kekerasan, melainkan dengan damai. Walau demikian gerakan HTI ini ditengarai justru menghambat proses demokratisasi di Indonesia.

Katakunci: Fundamentalis, Demokrasi, Kekhalifahan.

Abstract: This paper examines the emergence of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) as an openly fundamentalist movement in the democratic era. HTI existed in Indonesia since the early 1980s. This paper explores how HTI use the democratic public sphere to disseminate its ultimate goal restoring an Islamic Caliphate marked by the implementation Islamic laws or *syari'ah* in daily life. Furthermore, whether HTI can be consistent to refrain from restoring violence. Therefore, HTI's activities may possibility hamper the process of consolidating democracy in Indonesia.

Keywords: Fundamentalists, Democracy, Caliphate.

Introduction

The downfall of Suharto's regime in 1998 produced an explosion of social, political and religious movements as channels for aspirations that had been repressed for decades. One consequence of this 'sense of freedom' was the rise of political Islam. The aspirations of political Islam in the post-Suharto era were expressed through the establishment of many Islamic parties using Islam as their ideology; for certain groups among Muslims, calls for the implementation of *shari'a* law, and the proliferation of radical Islamic groups such as *Lasykar Jihad* (Jihad Troops), *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, or Islamic Defence Front), *Hizbut Tahrir* (Party of Liberation), and *Angkatan Mujahidin Indonesia* (the Jihad Fighter Group of Indonesia).¹

The presence of these radical Islamic groups attracted attention from both domestic and international media and academics, mainly after 9/11 2001 in the USA and subsequent terrorist attacks in Indonesia. The strong allegation was that a number of radical Islamic movements, such as *Laskar Jihad* and *Jemaah Islamiyah*, were terrorist organisations, and targets in the West's 'global war on terror'. Not surprisingly, some scholars argued that the al-Qaeda network had spread into Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.² Some argue that the radical Islamist movements were brought to Indonesia from the Middle East, which accounts for its militancy and violence as part of a global threat.³ This assessment of political Islam in Indonesia, however, is an over-simplification that ignores the variations in the phenomena of transnational Middle Eastern Islamist movements. Not all Islamist movements in Indonesia committed violence or terrorism. Gerakan Tarbiyah and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia were two instances of fundamentalist Islamic groups that were committed to physical non-violence. In this regard Ayooob argues that "most contemporary transnational Islamist activities do not fall within the jihadist description"⁴ and that transnational Islamist movements were very numerous, ranging from missionary (*da'wa*) to political activity.⁵

This paper will focus on *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI), a fundamentalist Islamic group that eschewed physical violence and which was never known to be involved in achieving its goals through terrorist activities. HTI is a branch of *Hizbut Tahrir* (HT) which was

founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqiuddin an-Nabhani. He was born (1909) in *Ijizm*, a village near Haifa,⁶ in Northern Palestine. HT is a trans-national Islamist movement. Although, HT in Indonesia is a radical Islamist party, it strictly opposes violence and terrorism in promulgating its objectives. Ismail Yusanto, who is a well-known spokesman for HTI, argued that 'in spreading its message, HTI holds to one fundamental principle, non-violence. To change people through violence will never succeed'.⁷

HTI is deserving of academic attention for two reasons. First, in general HT and HTI, like other radical Islamisist groups, have as their ultimate political aim, the establishment of an Islamic state, in the form of a Caliphate, over the world, beginning with Muslim countries or those countries, such as Indonesia, whose majority populations are Muslim. HT is also opposed to America, capitalism, democracy, liberalism and nation-states. However, it does not justify the use of violence or terrorism in establishing an Islamic Caliphate, unlike al Qaeda or other groups which commit acts of terrorism, justifying violence when it is used against *kufir* (non believers) for the purpose of restoring the Caliphate.⁸ Similarly, in an Indonesian context, HTI is unlike other Islamist groups, such as FPI, for example, which proclaims the legitimacy of the use of violence in establishing *syari'a law* in daily life.

Secondly, some Western scholars view the presence of HT in many countries as a serious threat. Ariel Cohen, for example, encouraged the US to protect Central Asia from HT's effort to destabilize it. He warned that HT was potentially the source of "the next wave of political violence" in Central Asia. According Cohen, HT promotes an anti-American agenda, tends towards extremism, and uses violence.⁹ A similar view was expressed by analysts who use a security approach to warn about HT, but were less knowledgeable about Islam. Such scholars tended to conclude that HT was a terrorist organization "in the mould of al-Qaeda" and highly recommend the abolition of the group and a freeze on its asset.¹⁰ ZeynoBaran, for instance, portrayed HT as a 'conveyor belt for terrorism', and 'Islam's Bolsheviks'.¹¹ He argued that HT has as its ultimate goal to take over of Western and Muslim governments to replace them with a Caliphate. Though HT

was not involved in terrorist acts, it was concluded after S-11 that, based on its ideology, HT was likely to urge its adherents to use terrorist acts.¹² However, these assessments of HT, in the anti-Islamic political climate after S-11, were open to serious scrutiny because HT in Indonesia was not involved in violence and never advocated violence or terrorist activities. HT in Indonesia was not involved in any of the terrorist bombings against western interests after S-II. Ken Ward argued that one of reasons why HTI was acceptable in Indonesia is because HTI refused violence as a part of its strategy and did not have militia, unlike other radical Islamist groups.¹³

This paper is going to examine and assesses HTI's doctrine of non-violence in the context of the West's post-S-11 war on terror in general, and the emergence of a democratic public sphere in Indonesia after the fall of the Soeharto's regime in 1998 in particular. The democratic transition, and subsequent consolidation of democracy in Indonesia, had a profound effect on the political ideology and strategies adopted by HTI to achieve its long standing goals of basing all aspects of social life on Islamic teachings and law, and establishing an Islamic state. In this regard, the number of questions will be provided as guidance; did HTI have the potential to hamper the process of consolidating democracy in Indonesia, given that it used its freedoms to oppose freedom for other, 'non-believers'? Finally, though HTI advocated 'non-violence' and was not involved in terrorism, as understood by the west in its war on terror, did HTI resolve the contradiction between its freedoms of expression and association and political goal of establishing an Islamic state and global Caliphate by resorting to forms of symbolic violence? The answer to this last question is yes, posing a major contradiction for HTI that will limit its ability to engage in democratic politics and gain popular support, but also threatens the consolidation of Indonesian democracy.

Violence: Meaning and Category

To avoid the misconception of term "violence" in this paper, I feel need to clarify it. According Johan Galtung there are three forms of violence; direct, structural, and cultural violence. Direct violence includes killing, maiming, sanctions, misery, desocialization,

repression, expulsion, and so on. This feature of violence is easy to recognize, as it is 'physical', though most definitions of contemporary terrorism also stress the 'threat' of violence. This form of 'violence', according to Galtung, 'tends to be institutionalized, repetitive, and ritualistic, like a vendetta'.¹⁴ Conversely, Structural violence and cultural violence are more complex. The key word for understanding structural violence is 'exploitation'. Its simple logic is that 'the topdogs get much more out of the interaction in the structure than others, the underdogs'. In other words, there is 'unequal exchange' in interactions and relations between actors.¹⁵ The process of exploitation is sustained by two other steps in structural violence. The first step is penetration combined with segmentation. The former means that the topdogs force the underdogs to speak based on the topdogs' interests. The latter refers to the topdogs' effort to limit the explanation of what really happens to the underdog. The second step is marginalisation combined with fragmentation. Marginalisation is an exertion to put and maintain the underdog on the periphery or outside, while fragmentation is to set the underdogs apart from each other.¹⁶

The final feature of violence, according to Johan Galtung, is cultural violence. It refers to any aspect of culture, including religion, ideology, language, art, empirical science, and formal science (logic, mathematics), that can be utilized as a justification for and legitimization of direct and structural violence. As a result, both direct and structural violence look natural and right, or 'normal'.¹⁷ For example, as part of culture, religion plays a pivotal role in triggering violence because religion as a set of beliefs is easily manipulated by leaders to support violence by followers. For example, there are usually strict dichotomies between good and evil in which the former is quite often associated with God, or as revealed by God to the leader, while the latter refers to Satan, with which the leader denounces the sins of opponents. Such black and white dichotomies create sharp opposition between 'the Chosen One (by God) and the Unchosen Ones by God, chosen by Satan'. Those who are the chosen ones will receive eternal salvation and closeness to God in Heaven, whereas the unbelievers will be doomed to eternal damnation in hell with Satan.. According to Galtung, Heaven and Hell are also said to be

felt on earth in the form of misery and luxury, which are preparations for Hell/Heaven.¹⁸ This view justifies violence by believers who judge others to be ‘unchosen’ and unworthy.

Meanwhile, Mary R Jackman in “Violence and Legitimacy in Expropriative Social Relations”, offers a definition of violence based on the ‘injuriousness of actions’. She argues that violence contains ‘an action that inflicts, threatens, or causes injury’. The form of the injuries ‘may be corporal that has consequences such as ‘pain, laceration, death, functional and impairment’, and are against the ‘basic need of physical survival, avoidance of pain, and preservation of bodily integrity and autonomy’. It may be psychological including ‘fear, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, or diminished self-esteem’, encompassing ‘the destruction, loss, or defacement of property or the loss of earnings’, or it may be social which includes ‘stigmatization, exclusion, imprisonment, banishment, or expulsion’.¹⁹ Violence ‘may be corporal, written, or verbal’. Because corporal violence is more easily identified, actors or agents of violence often try to use written or verbal means instead. Such ways may lead to injurious results either directly, ‘as in formal edicts or contracts stipulating physical harm against an individual or group’, or indirectly such as a ‘a moral or physical threat’ against individuals or groups.²⁰

By considering these definitions of violence, it can be said that the forms it can take are diverse, ranging from direct or physical to symbolic violence, and which may be committed in various ways. Related to the assessment of *Hizbut Ut Tahrir Indonesia* in this writing, what is relevant from Galtung’s conception of violence is that religion has the potential to justify or legitimise violence. It does not mean that religion is inherently violent or will lead inevitably to violence. Whether or not religion results in violence depends arguably on the leader’s interpretation of the religion’s tenets and the fanaticism of followers. In other words, religion has the theological teachings and symbols to justify terrorist violence.²¹ Mary R. Jackman argues that the psychological and social outcomes of violence, publications defending violence and verbal calls to violence have to be taken into account.

The Challenges to Democracy Posed by HTI

HTI's appeal for restoration of the caliphate and implementation of *shari'ah* will likely pose several challenges for the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia. Widely held and mobilised rhetoric that rejects democracy as alien to Islam and its involvement in structural violence may undermine acculturation of democratic values necessary for democratic consolidation. In this section, reasons behind HTI's rejection of democracy will be explained in more detail, followed by explanation of HTI's involvement in structural violence and its vitriolic rhetoric.

HTI's Refusal of Democracy

There are several specific reasons of why HTI strongly rejects democracy revolving around arguments as we have seen, that democracy allegedly contradicts the principles of Islamic governance. First, HTI sees democracy as a man-made political system that aims at protecting people from authoritarianism, injustice, and elites' domination in the name of religion. Because it is a human creation, HTI argues that democracy has nothing to do with religion or divine revelation.²² It has no roots in Islamic doctrine or history and thus it is alien to Islam. Second, HTI denounces democracy as secular because it is rooted in a political ideology that separates religion and state and relegates religion to the private domain. This contradicts with HTI's interpretation of Islam which argues for the inseparability of Islam and the state.²³

Third, HTI explains that democracy is 'ruling of the people, for the people, and by the legislation of the people'.²⁴ HTI concludes, rightly, that it means democracy vests sovereignty and rule-making in the people. People are also able to revoke laws according to their own consideration and have a right to determine a ruler or leader.²⁵ This principle, according to HTI, contradicts Islamic governance that puts sovereignty into the hand of *shari'ah*(God) and the power to rule (*assulthan*) to the *umma*.²⁶ The right to make legislation belongs only to God and therefore all human legislation must abide by this principle.²⁷ Fourth, democracy requires a majority vote as a benchmark in decision-making whilst Islam declares that not all matters may be

resolved by simply relying on a majority vote. Some cases such as the stipulation of legal matters should not be based on the majority's opinion but must refer to legal experts.²⁸ Lastly, democracy covers all kinds of freedoms ranging from freedom of belief to personal freedom and has to ensure the freedom of every single person in order that they may implement sovereignty.²⁹ Whereas Islam restricts the concept of freedom. For example, it does not tolerate the freedom of religion. One who wants to convert his/her religion will be sanctioned.³⁰

HTI's rejection of democracy is its appeal in the public sphere to tilt opinion to opposing democracy as the only political game in Indonesia. As it attempts to reach and recruit grass-root audiences, HTI's attitude of denouncing democracy may disrupt the on-going socialisation of a democratic political culture that is necessary for the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia. According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, democracy will only be consolidated once the three factors are met:

Behaviourally, no significant institutions or actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or turning to violence. Attitudinally, a strong majority of citizens believe that the democratic procedures and institutions are "the only game in town" to govern collective life in society. Constitutionally, governmental and non-governmental forces alike become committed to resolving conflicts within the specific laws, procedures and institutions sanctioned by the democratic process.³¹

In a same vein, Prezeworski argues that:

*Democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a particular system of institution becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine action outside the democratic institutions, when all the loser wants to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost.*³²

From these quotations, democracy is consolidated when there is a shared conviction among political elites, political organisations, mass-based organisations and, more importantly, the public at large that democracy is a useful and worthwhile means for dealing with a wide range of social and political problems that come to surface.

Democracy is the only rule of game accepted by the state and all segments of society should take part in achieving democracy. It does not overlook the diversity of opinions, organisations and political parties. As long as the differences are played out under democratic norms, procedure, and expectations, political contests are acceptable. In other words, no group, for example, has the right to take advantage of democracy by enjoying the freedom of expression and assembly it confers to deny such freedoms to others, and disrupt or even replace democracy with another system. This political scenario applies to HTI when it exploits democracy to promote anti democratic rethoric through mass demonstrations and public propaganda. In short, HTI enjoy democratic freedom to instill imagination of action and objectives outside democratic institutions in the public sphere. HTI challenges other civil society groups that aspire to support consolidation of democracy in Indonesia. This is even more the case when HTI utilises its politically influential networks to affect political change toward non-democratic goals, as will be described below.

HTI's Penetration in MUI

The growing political influence of the MUI provides opportunities for HTI to affect political changes that it aspires to. Using MUI's network of religious authority is a strategic political manuevere, considering that HTI and other radical groups do not posses as much religious charisma as MUI. In addition, the influence of MUI's religious conservatism grew during the decade after 2001.³³ President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono when officially opening the National Meeting held by MUI in November 2007, welcomed the MUI *fatawa*, 'legal opinion of an Islamic scholar'.³⁴ The President also asked the public to stand firm against deviant beliefs:

*... Thus, according to rules of the game, MUI issued a fatwa. President cannot issue fatwa. After the fatwa was issued, the tools of the state carry out their duties. Hopefully the cooperation will be enhanced in the future.*³⁵

The tactic used was to go into the MUI and assist its agenda on behalf of the MUI.³⁶ Together with other radical groups such as DDII (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* or the *Indonesian Islamic*

Missionary Council)³⁷, HTI got involved in the Congress of Indonesian Muslims (KUII) held by MUI in April 2005. Through the important individuals in these groups, such as IslamiYusanto, Muhammad al-Khaththath from HTI and K.H. CholilRidwan from DDII, they succeeded in pushing the agenda of *shari'ahas* a congressional recommendation.³⁸

As a result, at national conference VII on 28 July 2005 in Jakarta, MUI issued a number of *fatawa*. One was a ban on JAI³⁹ (*Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia* or Indonesia Ahmadiyah Community) since, according to MUI, JAI had recognised its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a Prophet after the last Prophet Muhammad. The notion contradicted the fundament tenet of Islam that there is no Prophet after Muhammad. Thus, MUI claimed that JAI was a deviant and heretical organization.⁴⁰

In a further attempt to infiltrate MUI, together with other Islamic fundamentalists, HTI succeeded in gaining two prominent figures as committee members of the council for the period 2005-2010.⁴¹ They were Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, holding the position of Vice Chairman of the Commission of Research, and Muhammad al-Khaththath, serving as Vice Secretary of the Commission of *dak'wah*. The former Commission is in charge of conducting research concerning Islamic phenomenon and thus its findings form recommendation for the council when issuing a *fatwa*. The Commission plays a pivotal role. The aim of the latter Commission is to disseminate *dak'wah* throughout the country.⁴²

Since MUI issued a fatwa banning JAI, HTI advocated issuing *fatawa* as an important agenda for achieving the public's sympathy.⁴³ It also demanded the government ban Ahmadiyah.⁴⁴ By utilizing FUI a coalition dominated by hardliners, with the FPI and Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia as two of its largest components and a senior HTI official, Muhammad al-Khaththath, as its Secretary General,⁴⁵ and also as member of MUI, HTI conducted demonstrations in favour of a ban on JAI⁴⁶ and pushed the government to disperse JAI.⁴⁷ In an article entitled '*FUI Minta Pemerintah Larang Ahmadiyah*' (*FUI Asking the Government to ban Ahmadiyah*), HTI and FUI urged the government to ban the *Ahmadiyyah*. "So that no horizontal conflict," said Secretary

General Al-Khaththath, when he visited the Attorney General on 3 January 3 2008. According to al-Khaththath, 'freedom of religion is a human right. So if the *Ahmadiyyah* did not confess Islam, it's no problem'.⁴⁸ On 9 June 9 2008 the Indonesian government eventually enacted the so-called a Joint Ministerial Decree signed by the Attorney General's office, the Ministry of Religion and the Ministry of Home Affairs,⁴⁹ which required JAI to freeze all its activities.⁵⁰ The decree declared that JAI's adherents who did not heed the degree would be subjected to sanction.⁵¹

Considering HTI's penetration in MUI and relentless pressure on the government in the JAI case, it may argue that HTI contributed indirectly to creating structural violence. HTI, with other radical groups, successfully utilised influential institutions, such as FUI and MUI, and the government to ban JAI. The success was marked by the creation of the *fatwa* and the Decree that certainly marginalised and intimidated the minority religious group which existed in Indonesia since 1925. Equally important, in ICG's report entitled 'Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree', it was asserted that 'civil rights groups and many public figures argued that any state-imposed restrictions violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion'.⁵² The prohibition of JAI contradicted the 1945 Constitution based on *Pancasila*, which guaranteed the freedom of religion. For instance, the First Article of Paragraph 28 in the Constitution declared that: 'Every citizen has the right to follow his/her religion and worship according to his/her beliefs...'.⁵³ Also, it was not in accordance with principles of democracy such as tolerance, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion.

Vitriolic Rhetoric

Referring to the definition of violence used in this writing that it may also be committed by using written or verbal means, such as making 'a moral or physical threat' to an individual or group, HTI can be categorised as a movement that uses violence. Despite never being proven to have carried out physical violence and terrorist activities in achieving its objectives,⁵⁴ HTI sometimes utilises inflammatory and provocative language, mainly in describing non-Muslims as the

enemies of Islam. HTI, according to Ken Ward, performs ‘violent rhetoric’. This is because ‘HTI’s language is indeed often vitriolic as it denounces the enemies of Islam, the indigenous servants of capitalism, and imperialism, or the assorted social ills those forces have inflicted on Indonesia.’⁵⁵ In an article entitled ‘*HTI Serukan Perang terhadap Pornografi*’ (*HTI Calls for War against Pornography*), HTI called on the government, the police, representatives, community leaders, and the Indonesian people to declare “war” on and to get rid of pornography from Indonesia.⁵⁶ On 21 February 2008, around 300 members of HTI staged a demonstration in Bandung, demanding the Danish cartoonist humiliating the Prophet Muhammad be executed. ‘Capital punishment’ was the only course of action.⁵⁷

In May 2012 HTI’s attention and anger was attracted by a planned Lady Gaga’s concert in Jakarta. The concert was cancelled eventually due to mounting pressure from conservative and Islamist groups, including HTI. On 25 May 2012, hundreds of students belonging to HTI did a street protest against Lady Gaga’s arrival in Indonesia. They recognised that her arrival was a form invasion by an unbeliever (*kufir*) that would destroy the younger generation’s morality. ‘We reject the arrival of Lady Gaga, because it contained disobedience and could damage the morality of the nation’s next generation’, said one student, Mauladina in a speech.⁵⁸ Posters carried by students delivered messages such as: “Save our Generation with Syari’ah and Caliphate”, “Reject the Invasion of Infidel Culture”, “Lady Gaga Queen of Demon Lady Gaga Invite You To Hell”, and “Destroy Liberalism Rise Khilafah”.⁵⁹

Like other Islamic Radical groups such as MMI, HTI argues that the concept of infidel (*kufir*) rest upon the ‘black and white’ paradigm. The notion ‘divides the world into two opposing halves, the world of Islam and the world of infidels (*kufir*), based on the idea of permanent conflict between truth (*al-haq*) and falsity (*al-bathil*)’.⁶⁰ Therefore, according to Ahnaf:

*The fundamentalist’s characterization of the Other as having a nature of endless enmity to Islam, threatening Islam, not being good leaders or alliances, and inherently in perpetual conflict with Muslim are also an example of symbolic violence,*⁶¹

Taking this description into account, it may be said that the use of negative images and rude language by HTI in drawing the Other (non-Muslims and Muslims who disagree with it) is a form of violence. In short, it is argued that HTI may undermine the process of consolidating democracy in Indonesia. Its widely disseminated rhetoric that calls on people to reject democracy and its involvement in structural violence may contribute to the weakening of democratic culture necessary for the consolidation of democracy.

Conclusion

The presence of HTI in the democratic public sphere generated a series of ideological challenges. It faced the dilemma of an ideology that, on the one hand was clearly not in accordance with democracy, rejecting this system because it rests upon a secular paradigm that separates state from religion and the sacred cause. On the other hand, HTI accepted as a political reality that Indonesia is a state in the process of consolidating democracy.

However, HTI faced another dilemma. Though it advocated non-violence and was not involved in terrorism, HTI found it difficult to resolve the contradiction between its freedoms of expression and association, and strict rejection of democracy and the political objective of establishing a global Caliphate. This paper argued that HTI's aggressive political rhetoric amounted to forms of symbolic and structural violence because of this dilemma. At the level of structural violence, together with other Islamist groups, HTI was able to influence institutions such as MUI and the state itself. HTI succeeded in placing its two prominent figures in strategic positions in MUI and pushing shari'a agenda in MUI. As a result, at National Conference VII on 28 July 2005 in Jakarta, MUI enacted a number of *fatawa*. Among them was a ban on JAI since it had acknowledged its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, as a Prophet after the last Prophet Muhammad. This move was condemned as heresy because it contradicted the fundamental tenets of Islam that there is no Prophet after Muhammad. HTI succeeded in pressuring the Indonesian government to ban JAI. On 9 June 2008 the government enacted the so-called Joint Ministerial Decree, signed by the Attorney

General's office, the Ministry of Religion and the Ministry of Home Affairs, which required JAI to freeze all its activities. The decree declared that JAI's adherents who did not heed the degree would be subjected to sanction.

At the level of rhetorical or symbolic violence, HTI had potential to trigger disunity among religious followers, not only among Islam's adherents themselves, but also between Islam and non-Muslims, threatening to destroy Indonesia's hard won harmony and pluralism and lead to future conflict. HTI often used inflammatory and provocative language, mainly in portraying non-Muslims as the enemies of Islam, the indigenous servants of capitalism and imperialism, or blaming them for an assortment of social ills.

The writing argued that the involvement of HTI in triggering symbolic and structural violence more likely has the potential to hamper the process of consolidating democracy if HTI does not succeed in resolving the ideological and political dilemmas it confronts.

Endnotes

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- ³² Saiful Mujani, *Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, Unpublished Dissertation, OHIO State University, 2003, 235.
- ³³ MUI was established on July 26, 1975 in Jakarta as a result of the meeting attended by a large number of Muslim scholars, intellectuals, and government from all over the country. Basically, there are five main role of MUI, namely; as successor of Prophet's tasks, as giver of *fatwa*, as guide of the *ummah*, as a organization serving to make reform and renewal, and as a organization serving to call for the enforcement of good deed and the prevention of bad deed, 'Profil MUI (About us)', *Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, 08 May 2009, available in http://www.mui.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=53, accessed on 30 June 2012. 'Mui was established with the endorsement of former President Soeharto', see Benhard Plattdasch, 'Religious Freedom in Indonesia: The Case of The Ahmadiyah', in ISEAS Working Paper: *Politics and Security Series*, no. 2, 2011, 3
- ³⁴ Melissa Crouch, 'Indonesia, Militant Islam, and Ahmadiyah: origin and Implications', in *Islam, Syari'ah and Governance Background Paper Series*, (University of Melbourne, Melbourne Law School, 2009), 4
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- ³⁶ Ismail Hasani, et.all, *Radikalisme Agama di Jabodetabek dan Jawa Barat: Implikasinya terhadap Jaminan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkayinan*, 102.
- ³⁷ DDII was established by Mohammad Natsir, the former chairman of MASYUMI. After the MASYUMI being dissolved in 1960, he initiated to build another institution to continue the MASYUMI's spirit and initial ideas through missionary way. Luthi Assyaukanie, *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia*, 138.
- ³⁸ Ismail Hasani, et.all, *Radikalisme Agama di Jabodetabek dan Jawa Barat:*

Implikasinya terhadap Jaminan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkayinan, 102-3

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